THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
the plaintiff must pay because he holds in trust 3o for the defendant means that the
funds must be traceable and therefore certain; and the notion that the plaintiff is
required to pay upon an implied promise3 because "in equity and good conscience
he ought to have promised," can be much more easily applied where the amount is
certain, since the imposition of an implied promise to pay an uncertain amount seems
more arbitrary than the imposition of an implied promise to pay a sum certain.
It may be urged, however, that a court of equity should find some difficulty with
the proposition thus established: the power company ought to pay something, but
because the amount it should pay is uncertain, it will not be required to pay anything
at all. While it is true that the amount cannot be ascertained with the same degree of
certainty that has usually characterized restitution cases, still it cannot be said that
there is no precedent for allowing recovery. Thus, where a commissioner's court created a second office of justice of the peace to serve in the same territory with the first
justice of the peace, and the first obtained an erroneous injunction against the second's
taking office, the second recovered a jury's estimate of the amount of profits lost, although there appears to have been no standard of measurement.32 Furthermore, the
county in the instant case was able to present at least some criterion of measurement.
The county alleged that it had made a number of contracts with prospective customers
who would take an estimated half of the total production; and there is also a statement
made by a witness for the power company in the injunction suit, to the effect that the
power company would lose $250,000 per year if the injunction was not granted. It is
submitted that the objections to the use of these standards of measurement 3 are not
so grave as to prevent an extension of the doctrine of restitution so as to allow recovery
in the instant case; that any injustice inherent in the possibility that the power company might be required to pay more than it took from the county is far outweighed by
the manifest injustice of a complete denial of recovery.

Labor Law-Effect of Anti-injunction Acts on Municipal Ordinances, CommonLaw Actions, and Sherman Act-[Washington].-The defendant was prosecuted for
violating an anti-picketing ordinance of the city of Yakima which declared it illegal to
"walk back and forth, loiter or remain upon the streets" in front of any business house
for the purpose of dissuading anyone from entering such place of business, The
30 Love v. North American Co., 229 Fed. io3 (C.C.A. 8th 1g1s); Berthold-Jennings Lumber
Co. v. St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co., 8o F. (2d) 32 (C.C.A. 8th I935), cert. den. 297 U.S. 715

(1936).

N.Y. 363, 30 N.E. 963, 964 (1892).
S.W. 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). The recovery is really
restitution, but in view of the facts that it is called "damages" (recoverable on injunction
bond) and that, as already pointed out, where damage theory is applied the measure may be
less certain than in restitution cases, the question may be raised whether recovery would have
been allowed if it had been necessary to call it "restitution."
33 Note 24 supra.
I In addition, the ordinance provided: pickets must be citizens of the United States, must
never have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, must walk on the outer margin of the sidewalk, and only two may picket at any one place. The maximum penalty for
violation of the ordinance was $ioo fine and ninety days imprisonment. Yakima Ord. No.
31 Haebler v. Myers,
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32 Castleman v. Williams, 263

B-,3Oi (1939).
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ordinance exempted from its provisions individuals employed for three months or more
in the picketed place of business if they had been so employed within sixty days of the
time of picketing. The defendant did not come within the excepted class. On appeal
from conviction, held, the ordinance was invalid because inconsistent with the policy
expressed in the state "Norris-LaGuardia" act. Judgment reversed. Yakima v. Got-

halm.
Abuse of the labor injunction led to the passage of both federal and state "NorrisLaGuardia" acts, 3 which deprived courts of jurisdiction in labor disputes to enjoin
picketing if unaccompanied by fraud or violence. The resulting restriction on the use
of the injunction against organized labor makes resort to other devices more likely,
namely: local ordinances, common law civil and criminal actions, and prosecutions
and triple-damage suits under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
The ordinance whose validity was in issue in the principal case is typical of recent
municipal regulations restricting picketing.4 Regulations of this type are adopted
pursuant to the municipal power to pass "all such local police .... regulations as are
not in conflict with the general laws .... ." of the state.s Although texts and dicta 6
enunciate a broad rule that any ordinance is invalid if it conflicts with the policy,
spirit, or provisions of the general laws, courts hesitate to invalidate ordinances unless
they are clearly in conflict with statutory provisions. Such an inconsistency exists if
the ordinance expressly prohibits what a statute expressly permits, or vice versa.? An
2

94 P. (2d) i8o (Wash. 1939).

3 Among those activities

defined by the federal act as non-enjoinable when occurring in any
labor dispute and when committed by persons participating or interested therein, is the giving
publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in any labor dispute, by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or other methods not involving fraud and violence. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29
U.S.C.A. §§ zoi-iS (Supp. 1939). The following states have enacted provisions similar to

those in the federal act: Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Utah, Washington. Wisconsin has a sightly different provision.
For a collection of state statutes see C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv., indexed at page 8ooi (1939). See
in general, Riddlesbarger, State Anti-Injunction Legislation, 14 Ore. L. Rev. 5oi (1935).
4 Local Union No. 26 v. Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72, 5 N.E. (2d) 624 (1937) (all picketing prohibited); People v. Gidaly, 93 P. (2d) 66o (Cal. 1939) (picketing must be by a majority of
employees, and by persons employed not less than thirty days); People v. Young, 2 L.R.R. 59o
(Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles Co. 1938) (prohibited display of banners or signs in front of a
business house for the purpose of persuading people not to trade there).
5This provision of the Washington Constitution, Art. ii, § ii, is typical of the general
grant of police power made to most municipalities. Such a grant may be made in the state
constitution, in statutes, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939), c. 24, § 65.65, or by charter provision, Ex parte
Stout, 82 Tex. Crim. 183, i98 S.W. 967 (1917).
6Marengo v. Rowland, 263 Ill.
531, 534, xo5 N.E. 285, 286 ('914); People ex rel. Russell v.
Andrews, 339 Ill.
157, 159, 171 N.E. x37, 138 (1930); 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations
§ 685 (1939).
7 Levering v. Park Com'r, 134 Md. 48, zo6 Ati. 176 (1919) (ordinance permitted profes-

sional baseball games on Sunday while a statute forbade work and labor on Sunday). See
Struthers v. Sokol, io8 Ohio St. 263, 14o N.E. 519 (1923) (acts punishable in the liquor statute

not punished in the ordinance, and acts punished in the ordinance were not punished by the
statute). But see State v. Brown, 142 Md. 27, rig Ati. 684 (1922) (statute required drivers to
yield right of way to cars approaching the intersection from the right, but ordinance granted
absolute right of way to fire apparatus).
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inconsistency does not exist if the ordinance merely provides for "additional regulation" of the activities already regulated by the statute.8 The power to make "additional regulations," however, does not include the power to prohibit absolutely the
general activity the abuse of which the legislature purports to regulate.9
Prior to the passage of the "Norris-La Guardia" acts anti-picketing ordinances were
generally held to be a valid exercise of municipal police power.o The enactment in
many states of the "Norris-La Guardia" acts has brought about a tendency to invalidate such ordinances. The path to such a result is somewhat obstructed by the
wording of the statute, which does not legalize picketing but merely makes it nonenjoinable.
Thus, some courts have held that all remedies other than the injunction remain
unaffected." Under this view, a criminal ordinance forbidding picketing by nonemployees is not inconsistent with the state statute.' 2 But even in these jurisdictions
courts are often swayed by the change in public opinion manifested by the passage of
the act and tend to be more ready to strike down some provisions in anti-picketing
ordinances on other grounds such as violation of due process. 3 Thus, regulations requiring a picket to carry a photograph of himself, to be able to read and write, and to
be a resident of the city for a year and a citizen of the United States have been held to
8Seattle v. Procter, 183 Wash. 299, 48 P. (2d) 241 (1935) (ordinance declaring unlawful the
deceptive use of the word "value" in advertising to convey the meaning that the article was
once sold for a higher price, and statute making unlawful untrue, deceptive, and misleading
advertisements); Birmingham v. West, 236 Ala. 434, 183 So. 421 (1938) (statute requiring
vaccination of dogs unless kept in an enclosure, on a leash, or muzzled, and ordinance requiring
vaccination of all dogs); Repass v. Richlands, 163 Va. 1112, 178 S.E. 3 (1935) (state liquor
license does not give licensee right to operate a liquor store in violation of an ordinance prohibiting them within 300 feet of a school); 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 683 (x939).
Legislative intent to exclude all local regulation will be given effect, Seattle Electric Co. v.
Seattle, 78 Wash. 203, 138 Pac. 892 (1914) (intent implied where commission set up to enforce
the statute).
9Nat'l Amusement Co. v. Johnson, 270 Mich. 613, 259 N.W. 342 (i935), noted in 14 Mich.
State B. J.368 (1935) (ordinance expressly prohibited all physical endurance contests while a
statute regulated them); Shelton v. Shelton, i Conn. 433, i~o Atl. 81x (1930) (ordinance
prohibited sale of raw milk but statute contained regulations on its production); Ward v.
Markstein, x96 Ala. 209, 72 So. 41 (1916) (an ordinance in form regulatory but really amounting to a prohibition of activity recognized by the state liquor act).
10 Ex parte Stout, 82 Tex. Crim. 183, 198 S.W. 967 (19x7); Thomas v. Indianapolis, 195
Ind. 44o, x45 N.E. 550 (1924); Ferguson v. Peake, 18 F. (2d) i66 (App. D.C. 1927); see Hall v.
Johnson, 87 Ore.

21,

169 Pac. 515 (i917).

11 Dehan v. Hotel &Restaurant Employees, 159 So. 637 (La. App. 1935); Aberdeen Restaurant Co. v. Gottfried, 158 Misc. 785, 285 N.Y. Supp. 832 (1935); Constitutionality of State
Statute Limiting Injunctions in Labor Dispute, 46 Yale L.J. 1064, xo66 (1937).
2See Int'l Ladies Garment Workers Union v. Westminster, i-A, L.R.R. Man. 684 (Md.
C.C. Carrol Co. 1937).
x3Nield,

State of Md. ex rel. v. Kimble, i-A, L.R.R. Man. 682 (Md. C.C. Alleghany Co.

1937). Even in states which have not passed "Norris-La Guardia" acts the courts have been

more ready to strike down anti-picketing ordinances, Diemer v. Weiss, 343 Mo. 626,
(2d) 922 (1938); People v. Gidaly, 93 P. (2d) 66o (Cal. x939).
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be invalid on these grounds.14 In other jurisdictions the courts have found in the state
"Norris-LaGuardia" act an implied intent to legalize the non-enjoinable activity and
to free it from all civil and criminal sanctions-Is Under this construction an ordinance
declaring it to be illegal for non-employees to picket -will be held inconsistent with the
statute. Even here, however, it would seem that the municipality has the power to
make "additional regulations." Thus, courts might uphold ordinances directed toward
insuring picketing without fraud or violence. Even the qualifications of pickets might
be prescribed, if reasonably related to avoiding fraud or violence. 6 Moreover, where
courts hold that in spite of the "Norris-LaGuardia" act all picketing, violent or peaceful, may be enjoined when sufficient violence has occurred to convince the court that
peaceful picketing is bound to result in violence,x7 the municipality might also have
power to apply sanctions.
The court in the instant case evidently feels that the anti-injunction statute, by
denying use of the most effective remedy against the non-enjoinable activities expresses a positive policy in favor of them. Local ordinances making picketing criminal
definitely contravene this policy. Along with provoking employees into the same open
defiance and disrespect for government which often accompanied injunctions prohibiting such acts,' the wholesale arrests which may ensue will too often give the employer an undue advantage by breaking up the picket line and consequently the
strike.9 Thus there may follow a recurrence of those evils which the statute sought to
eliminate. It would further seem that the general status of labor should not be left to
the varying regulations of municipalities easily influenced by the demands of local
manufacturers and by the desire to attract new industry. Nor will invalidation of these
ordinances destroy municipal power to prevent breach of the peace since the "additional regulation" doctrine will permit all necessary restrictions.
The result in the instant case therefore seems to be sound although the reasoning
employed by the court may be open to question. In spite of its previous decision that
the state "Norris-La Guardia" act was a violation of the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers, 20 the court here invalidated the ordinance as inconsistent with
the state "Norris-La Guardia" act.2' It countered the contention that an unconstituX4Nield, State of Aid. ex rel. v. Kimble, i-A, L.R.R. Man. 682 (Md. C.C. Alleghany Co.
1937).
ISLocal Union No. 26 v. Kokomo, 21 Ind. 72,5 N.E. (2d) 624 (I937); Eastwood-Neally
Co. v. Int'l Ass'n, 124 N.J. Eq. 274, 1 A. (2d) 477 (1938); Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' Int'l
Union, 358 Ill. 239, 246, 193 N.E.
6

1i2, 115 (1934).

Although some regulations of the qualifications of pickets have been held invalid as
arbitrary classifications (see note 14 supra), a regulation such as the one contained in the Yakima ordinance (see note i supra) which prohibited picketing by individuals convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude, would seem to be a valid additional regulation, that is, if
moral turpitude is not defined too broadly. It should not meet any objection as being an
arbitrary classification.
17 Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees Union, Local 830, 22 N.E. (2d) 320
(N.Y. 1939), noted in 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1i (1939).
is Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes 298 (1932).
19 36 Col. L. Rev. 153, 154 (1936).
20 Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 397, 63 P. (2d) 396 (x936).
2xCf. Adamsv. Wala Valla (Super. Ct. Walla Walla Co. 1938), digested in C.C.H. Lab. Law
.

Serv.

18i

(1938).
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tional statute is a nullity by the argument that the provision of the act making stranger
picketing non-enjoinable was declaratory of the common law as applied to the present
case and was therefore constitutional. This position seems questionable in view of
prior Washington decisions which held picketing within one hundred feet of a place of
business to be illegal and enjoinable;22 the picketing in the instant case was within this
limit.23 Likewise, the reliance by the court on an Indiana case24 involving a similar issue
seems questionable since that court held its anti-injunction act constitutional. The
self-contradiction involved in these decisions by the Washington court may be due to
recent changes in the court's personnel;2$ it is noteworthy that a dissenting justice in
the earlier case dealing with the anti-injunction act wrote the majority opinion in the
present case. Perhaps the result in Yakina v. Gorhampresages a reversal of the prior
decision on the constitutionality of the statute.
With frustration of municipal restrictive ordinances, employers will resort to civil
damage suits and criminal prosecutions against union members engaging in nonenjoinable conduct which was illegal at common law in order to nullify the effect of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. 26 Those courts which construe the act to legalize such conduct
indicate that to some extent it is no longer actionable or criminal at common law. And
even courts adopting the contrary construction, because of the change in policy evidenced by passage of the "Norris-LaGuardia" acts, may arrive at a similar result
through redefinition of "peaceful picketing" and "lawful means." An analogy which
lends support to these extensions of the act's policy is found in earlier state decisions
which interpreted similar provisions in the state "Clayton" acts to affect substantive
rights as well as the injunctive remedy.27 The fact that the act is a civil statute should
not prevent extension of its policy to limit criminal liability.J8 Nor does the statute
reveal a legislative intent opposed to such a construction. The original act passed by
"Sterling Chain Theaters v. Central Labor Council, '55 Wash. 217, 283 Pac. io8i (i93o);
Adams v. Local No. 400, 124 Wash. 564, 215 Pac. I9 (1923). See also Kimbel v. Lumber &
Saw Mill Workers Union, 189 Wash. 416, 65 P. (2d) io66 (I937).
23Brief for appellant, at 6, Yakima v. Gorham, 94 P. (2d) i8o (Wash. 1939).
'4 Local Union No. 26 v. Kokomo, 2111 nd. 72, 5 N.E. (2d) 624 (9,37).
' SIn the earlier case, which held the state "Norris-La Guardia" act unconstitutional,
Steinert, Holcomb, Tolman, Geraghty, Main, and Mitchell were in the majority, with Blake,
Millard, and Beals dissenting. Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., i88 Wash. 396, 63 P.
(2d) 397 (1936). In the instant case Blake, Millard, Beals, Geraghty, Robinson (appointed
since the Blanchard case), Simpson (appointed since the Blanchard decision), are in the
majority; Main and Steinert dissented.
26Courts have held illegal
activity which certainly would not be enjoinable under the injunction acfs as fraudulent or violent. See Bull v. Int'l Alliance, i9 Kan. 713, 24I Pac. 459 (1925)
(peaceful patrolling by solitary individual held illegal); Greenfield v. Central Labor Council,
IO4 Ore. 236, 207 Pac. i68 (1922) (calling in loud tones to prospective customers not to
patronize a business held illegal); Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes 53 (1932).
27Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1913), 1464, construed in Truax v. Bisbee, ig Ariz. 379, 171 Pac.
121 (i918), commented on in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 328 (1921); Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1939), c. 48 § 2a, construed in Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers Int'l Union, 358 Ill. 239, 193 N.E.
112 (i934). See also Brandeis' dissent in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443
(1921).
' 8See Parker v. Barnard,
r35 Mass. ii6 (z883); Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by
Criminal Legislation, i6 Minn. L. Rev. 361 (1932).
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Congress was aimed at the remedy and not the substantive right, partly, because
under the Rules of Decisions Act federal courts follow state substantive law. Failure to
describe the non-enjoinable acts as "lawful" or "legal" may have been due, in part, to
the fact that the court had seized on the words "lawful" and "legal" in the similar provision of the Clayton Act to justify the construction that the statute was merely
declaratory of the common law.' 9 It is unlikely that state legislatures attached any
different meaning from that of Congress to the similar provisions in their state "NorrisLaGuardia" acts. Moreover, in view of the construction often put upon the injunction
provision in state "Clayton" acts,30 the state legislatures may have anticipated the possibility of courts' construing the state "Norris-La Guardia" acts as changing substantive common law rights.3X
In addition to the ordinance and the common law action, the civil and criminal
sanctions32 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act may be employed to restrict labor activities.33 Although the Norris-La Guardia Act has been held to modify the Clayton
Act and to restrict the right to an injunction where there has been a violation of the
Sherman Act,34 it has not been held to destroy the civil or criminal causes of action

against certain union activities3S under the anti-trust provisions.
29

Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, I6 Minn. L. Rev. 638, 645 (1932).

3'See note 27 supra.
31 Cf. Senn v. Tile-Layers Protective Union, 3oi U.S. 468 (1937). There the statute expressly legalized the activity. If such a statute is constitutional, it is difficult to see why one
from which legalization is inferred should not likewise be constitutional. But see Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
32Liability under criminal provision has been, to some extent, rendered nugatory by a
restriction on use of the funds appropriated for enforcement of the Sherman Act. See Frank-

furter and Greene, The Labor Injunction, i4o-i (193o).
33. SStat. 693 (I937), IS U.S.C.A. § I (Supp. 1939) (criminal provision against combinations in restraint of trade); 38 Stat. 731 (i914), IS U.S.C.A. § 15 (i927) (provision for allowing

suit by private individuals for damage suffered by reason of the doing of acts forbidden by the
statute); 38 Stat. 731 (x914), iS U.S.C.A. § 17 (I927) (provision stating that nothing shall be
construed to forbid the existence and formation of labor organizations for purposes of mutual
help). For a general discussion of the application of these provisions to labor see Berman,
Labor and the Sherman Act (I93O); Witte, Government in Labor Disputes 6i (932); C.C.H.

Lab. Law Serv.
34M.

532-6 (1939); 43 Harv. L. Rev. 459 (1930).

and M. Wood Working Co. v. Plywood & Veneer Workers Local Union No.

102,

23

F. Supp. ii (Ore. 1938); Donnelly Garment Co. v. Int'l Ladies Garment Workers Union, g
F. (2d) 309 (C.C.A. 8th 1938). See Diamond Full Fashioned Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 20 F.
Supp. 467 (Pa. 1937); Union Premier Food Stores v. Retail Food C. & M. Union, 98 F. (2d)
821 (C.C.A. 3d 1938). But see Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 90 F. (2d) i55 (C.C.A. 3d 1937),
overruled in Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv.

18482 (C.C.A. 3d 1939);

Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 27 F. Supp. gi5 (Pa. 1939); Fehr Baking Co. v. Bakers' Union, 20 F.
Supp. 691 (La. 1937); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F. (2d) 284 (C.C.A. 2d 1934);
Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign Vriters' Local Union, 6 F. Supp. 164 (Mich. 1934); Grace Co.
v. Williams, 96 F. (2d) 478 (C.C.A. 8th 1938). It seems that Congress intended Section ios of
the Norris-La Guardia Act to prevent issuance of injunctions under the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, H.R. Rep. 669, 72d Cong. ist Sess. (1932).

3"It has been suggested that the Norris-LaGuardia Act makes non-enjoinable activities
which have been held to constitute a violation of the Sherman Act such as: refusing to work
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In determining whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act by implication exempts the nonenjoinable activities from all penalties under the Sherman Act, the court might recon6
sider the original doubt as to the applicability of the Sherman Act to labor,3 the attempt in the Clayton Act to obtain for labor more favorable treatment under the
Sherman Act,37 the severe civil penalties in the act, and the unpopularity of criminal
5
prosecutions under its provisions.3 The widespread criticism of the decision in Bedford
v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Association,39 where acts, now non-enjoinable, were held to
violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, suggest the desirability of a change in application.
It is arguable that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not reveal an intent to leave the
non-enjoinable activities subject to Sherman Act penalties, but that it cautiously
avoids any exemption merely as a tactical maneuver in order to avoid conflict with
Truax v. Corrigan.4o
Since repeals by implication are not favored,41 it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
will hold that the Norris-La Guardia Act fully repeals the Sherman Act in its application to non-enjoinable union activities. But some relaxation of the strict application of
the Sherman Act to organized labor may result42 from redefinition of "direct restraint"
and "intent to restrain," and by'applying the flexible "rule of reason" found in this
"charter of freedom," in a manner influenced by changes in the standards of the
times.43
Procedure-Counterclaim to Action by Partners-[Federal].-In a suit by members
of a partnership upon an obligation owed the firm, the defendant sought to counterclaim separate causes of action against each member of the firm. Held, counterclaims
on non-union goods shipped in interstate commerce, Bedford v. Journeyman Stonecutters
Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927); picketing and striking when a union seeks to prevent one manufacturer from dealing with a non-union manufacturer in the same trade or industry, Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). Christ, Federal Anti-Injunction Bill, 26
Ill. L. Rev. 516, 523 (x932).
36 Sharp, review of the book, Labor and the Sherman Act, 21 Am. Econ. Rev. 335 (1931).
3738 Stat. 731 (19x4), i5 U.S.C.A. § 17 (1927); 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C.A. § 52,
(1927).

Freund, Standards of American Legislation 223 (I917).
39 274 U.S. 37 (1927), and Brandeis' dissent, at 56; The Stonecutter's Case-Strikes on
"Unfair" Material Entering Interstate Commerce, 37 Yale L.J. 84 (1927); 43 Harv. L. Rev.
459 (193o); 4o Harv. L. Rev. 1154 (1927); 4 Wis. L. Rev. 250 (1927).
40 This decision indicated that the court would regard it a violation of due process to take
away all remedy against such activity as picketing. It should be noted that the decision may
be interpreted to rest on the libelous features of the picket's signs. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
4' Stewart v. United States, io6 F. (2d) 405 (C.C.A. 9th 1939); Borquist v. Ferris, 112
N.J. Eq. 557, 165 At. 417 (1933); State ex rel. Geo. Peck Co. v. Brown, 3 40 Mo. 1i89, io5 S.W.
(2d) 909 (i937); 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 247 (2d ed. I9o4); 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 316 (8th ed. 1927); Repeal or Amendment Implied from Later Inconsistent
Enactment, 37 Col. L. Rev. 292 (1937).
42 Labor and the Sherman Act, 49 Yale L. J. 518 (I94O); Gregory, Labor's Coercive Activities under the Sherman Act-The Apex Case, 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 347 (1940).
43 Appalachian Coals Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933)- "As a charter of
freedom, the Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in
constitutional provisions."
38

